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Definition/Description
The Greenbury Report on Directors Remunera-
tion (1995) (hereafter called the Greenbury
Report) was one of the first comprehensive gov-
ernance codes directly addressing executive and
director remuneration. TheGreenbury Reportwas
commissioned by the Confederation of British
Industry in response to public concerns over
recently privatized public utilities and the salaries
and bonuses earned by executives, while they
implemented job cuts, and service price increases.
The Greenbury Report recommended an indepen-
dent remuneration committee, linking executive
pay to corporate financial and operational perfor-
mance measures, and increased the requirements
for disclosure and transparency on directors’
remuneration. However, the credibility of the
Greenbury Report was challenged due to the
composition of the group; it was not deemed to
be independent of the sector it was to investigate,
and it was argued that its recommendations did
not go far enough.
The financial crisis of 2008 highlighted the
failure of the Greenbury Report’s recommenda-
tions for limiting excessive executive pay. In par-
ticular, the Walker Review of the Banking Sector
found that performance-based bonus schemes in
banking corporations that are supposed to align
executive objectives with shareholder objectives
increased corporate risk in the period leading up to
the financial crisis. In addition, during the crisis,
executive pay in large publicly listed corporations
(PLCs) continued to increase, while workers’
wages stagnated. Therefore, despite Greenbury’s
recommendations, executive pay continued, and
still continues, to be a concern for the public and
policymakers alike. Nonetheless, improved trans-
parency on remuneration and a greater linking of
pay to performance followed from the Greenbury
Report and most corporations now include opera-
tional measures linked to performance and
sustainability.
Introduction: The Problem of Excessive
Executive Pay
Corporate governance mechanisms are tradition-
ally seen as devices for reducing agency costs
between shareholders and managers. These costs
arise from mismatched incentives, information
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asymmetry, and a belief that executives are self-
serving at the expense of shareholders. However,
the role of governance is changing. Regulators
and governments are increasingly employing gov-
ernance tools that impose public responsibilities
on corporations, including measures that seek to
equalize wealth distribution, promote workforce
diversity and equality, and pursue environmental
objectives (Choudhury and Petrin 2018). The
result of this is that executive pay, particularly in
PLCs, is deemed to be of interest to a society at
large as the public, either directly through individ-
ual shareholdings or indirectly via institutional
investors such as pension schemes, invested in
them. Therefore, stakeholder theory argues that
the public’s interests should be protected by the
board and not sacrificed for executive rewards.
The public is interested in the sustainability of
corporations, as this ensures economic stability,
a strong financial sector, and employment. Recent
corporate failures have increased the public’s con-
cern about financial performance-based pay pack-
ages that incentivize excessive risk-taking.
Further public concerns have also arisen due to
actions taken by corporations in response to the
financial crisis. For example, many corporations
implemented freezes on workers’ wages and
started to employ workers on a casual basis,
using zero-hour contracts. The growth of these
contracts have raised broader societal issues of
distributive justice and fairness (Villiers 2010),
particularly as these austerity measures were not
typically applied to executive pay packages.
Background to the Greenbury Report
The Cadbury Report on Financial Aspects of
Corporate Governance (1992) included recom-
mendations on executive pay and the establish-
ment of a remuneration board subcommittee.
Within 2 years of the Cadbury Report, excessive
executive pay again became a hot issue as politi-
cians highlighted recent utility privatizations that
created 50 millionaires among the executives. A
key media focus was the 75% pay increase for the
chairman of British Gas, Cedric Brown, which
resonated with a society suffering from high
unemployment, resulting in demonstrations from
the public and small shareholders at the corpora-
tion’s annual general meeting (Jones and Pollitt
2002). The issue was highly embarrassing to a
government that made utility privatization one of
its key policy objectives. The government
approached the Confederation of British Industry
to investigate the matter. It subsequently
appointed Sir Richard Greenbury, Chairperson
and CEO of Marks and Spencer, to investigate
and produce a report and recommendations.
The terms of reference of the Study Group on
Directors’ Remuneration (hereafter called the
“Group”) were “to identify good practice in deter-
mining directors’ remuneration and prepare a
code of such practice for use by UK PLCs”
(Greenbury 1995, p. 9). Directors and boards of
large PLCs were the focus of the Group though
the Greenbury Report highlighted that the princi-
ples also applied to smaller listed corporations and
to other senior executives. The aim of the Group
was not necessarily to reduce executive pay, rather
to provide a means of establishing a balance
between executives’ pay and their performance
and enhancing accountability and transparency
on executives’ pay. The final Greenbury Report
was produced in 1995 and focused on providing
recommendations in four main areas, including:
• Remuneration committees
• Remuneration policy for executive and non-
executive directors
• Service contracts and compensation on
termination
• Disclosure
These are now discussed in turn.
Remuneration Committees
The Greenbury Report recommends all PLCs
establish a remuneration committee as a subcom-
mittee of the board and that it be assigned full
responsibility for all matters relating to executive
pay. Where this is not done, the board must
explain why and outline the alternative
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arrangements which have been put in place in the
annual report. The intention for the creation of
remuneration committees was to prevent execu-
tives from designing their own pay packages.
The Greenbury Report recommends that the
remuneration committee: has a clearly defined
terms of reference that ensures there is a corpora-
tion-wide policy on remuneration; determines
individual remuneration packages for each exec-
utive; and reports directly to shareholders on all
matters relating to executive remuneration. The
Greenbury Report recommends that membership
of the remuneration committee should comprise
only non-executive directors as they have no
direct personal financial interest in executive
remuneration. In addition, membership is not to
include directors with other executive director-
ships, as this could result in the bidding up of
one another’s remuneration. The remuneration
committee members are to have a good knowl-
edge of the corporate and its executive directors
and a full understanding of shareholder concerns.
As a result, Greenbury rejected proposals that the
remuneration committee include independent
members from outside of the corporation as they
would lack the recommended level of knowledge.
However, this was deemed to be a weakness as a
way around this could have been included, such as
ensuring that appropriate training or access to
relevant expert advice is provided to the remuner-
ation committee. The Greenbury Report recom-
mends that a minimum of three directors make up
membership of the remuneration committee in
large corporations. Finally, the report recom-
mends that the fees of non-executive directors,
some of whom will be members of the remunera-
tion committee, are determined by the whole
board.
Remuneration Policy
The underlying basis for the remuneration policy
outlined in the Greenbury Report is that executive
remuneration should be sufficient to attract
and retain the appropriate executive talent
though avoiding paying more than is necessary
for this purpose. To determine the appropriate
remuneration, theGreenbury Report recommends
the remuneration committee identify an appropri-
ate comparator group of corporations and investi-
gate how performance and remuneration are
linked in those corporations and how pay is
divided between the various fixed elements, such
as basic salary, benefits in kind, and variable ele-
ments, such as annual bonus and long-term incen-
tives. The Greenbury Report identifies a role for
both annual bonuses and long-term incentive
schemes to encourage and reward executive per-
formance. It is recognized that the mix of rewards
based on short-term and long-term indicators will
vary between corporations and are established by
the remuneration committee; however, the
Greenbury Report does emphasize that bonuses
are based on financial or operational measures that
are “relevant, stretching and designed to enhance
the business” (The Greenbury Report, 1995, p.
39). Similarly, the report recommends that long-
term incentive schemes, including share option
schemes, are payable only where stringent perfor-
mance criteria are met, criteria that measure some
aspect of the corporate’s performance. Bonuses
paid partly in the form of shares should be held
for a minimum period of time, to create a long-
term focus for the executives and to align their
interests more closely with shareholders. A well-
designed scheme should ensure that any “windfall
gains” are aligned with actual improvements in
corporate performance. Finally, the Greenbury
Report highlights that performance targets need
not be restricted to financial measures. They can
include “operational” measures of performance,
for example, quality or customer service. This
recognition of nonfinancial performance mea-
sures enables remuneration committees to include
sustainability targets such as reducing emissions
in performance-based remuneration packages.
For non-executive directors, the Greenbury
Report recommends fixed fees based on time
required for the role. It also counsels against set-
ting remuneration that is linked to performance. It
is argued that a fixed fee structure is more likely to
maintain independence. This indicates a steward-
ship view of the role of non-executive directors
and contrasts with the stance taken in the
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which is firmly set in an agency framework.
Service Contracts
The Greenbury Report recommends that director
service contracts are on a 1-year basis, to avoid
large termination payments due to early termina-
tion of 3- to 5-year contracts. Payments for con-
tract termination are not to be included in
employment contracts and, should be negotiated
if the situation arises and reflect the reasons for the
termination. Poor performance is not rewarded
with a generous exit package, and compensation
payments should be phased, rather than awarded
as a lump-sum. These payments should cease
when the director secures new employment.
Disclosure
To improve accountability and transparency on
remuneration, the Greenbury Report requires full
disclosure of information on all aspects of execu-
tive remuneration. The primary method of disclo-
sure is the Report of the Remuneration Committee
included in a company’s annual report. The remu-
neration committee report will outline the corpo-
rate’s general policy toward executive
remuneration and provide detailed information
on the actual remuneration packages of the indi-
vidual executives and the breakdown per execu-
tive of the elements of the packages. The
remuneration committee report should also out-
line the measures of performance used to deter-
mine rewards, how these relate to the long-term
corporate objectives, and how rewards are linked
to the measures themselves. In addition, details on
the composition of the comparator groups and
how they have performed are to be included.
To further align shareholder and executive
interests, the Greenbury Report recommends that
corporations seek a non-binding, advisory vote
from shareholders on long-term incentive
schemes. However, the Greenbury Report did
not recommend a vote on the remuneration com-
mittee report or the full executive pay details.
Criticism of the Greenbury Report
The Confederation of British Industry, the Insti-
tute of Directors, and political opposition criti-
cized the Greenbury Report and commented that
it had not gone far enough in regulating business
behavior (Jones and Pollitt 2002, p. 21). The main
criticisms of the Greenbury Report are now
outlined in brief.
It was claimed that a weakness underlying the
Greenbury Report was that it was a reactive
report, commissioned in response to public criti-
cisms of remuneration packages enjoyed by exec-
utives in recently privatized utility corporations.
Yet despite being commissioned in response to the
behavior of executives in setting their own pay in
utility corporations, interim reports did not
address utility corporations, although this was
rectified in the final report (Jones and Pollitt
2002).
It was argued that the Greenbury Report pro-
moted a tick-box approach to good governance
and executive remuneration. It enabled corpora-
tions, considered to have “excessive” executive
compensation packages, to claim best practice by
complying with the recommendations in the
Greenbury Report. For example, British Gas,
one of the corporations whose behavior led to
the commissioning of the report, claimed it was
at the leading edge of best practice simply because
it disclosed its policies (Jones and Pollitt 2002, p.
21)!
Weaknesses were also documented in respect
of its recommendations. The focus on the “knowl-
edge of the corporation” as the basis for excluding
external members from the remuneration commit-
tee implicitly excludes newly appointed directors,
yet newly appointed directors are arguably the
most independent. Thus, there is an implicit
trade-off between director independence and
knowledge of the corporation. This conflict
could have been eliminated had the Greenbury
Report recommended that the remuneration com-
mittee seek counsel from external expert advisors
and external consultants. New directors would not
be eliminated from being members of the remu-
neration committee as they could gain advice
from these experts when required. The inclusion
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of external remuneration advisors was later rec-
ognized in the revised Combined Code 2003, and
the use of external experts is now a common
practice. There is no guidance on how remunera-
tion committees can deal with potential challenges
and conflicts in the Greenbury Report.
It was argued that the Greenbury Report and
working group were self-serving, consisting
mostly of executives who benefitted from the
status quo and were unlikely to recommend any
radical new proposals (Jones and Pollitt 2002;
Price 2016). The Group lacked representation
from and engagement with other stakeholders,
such as small shareholders, employees, cus-
tomers, and the media whose voices led to the
creation of the Group (Jones and Pollitt 2002,
pp. 19–20). For example, the Greenbury Report
required that the remuneration committee have an
“understanding of shareholder concerns”; how-
ever, shareholders had limited involvement with
the working group that was established to review
executive remuneration, and specific procedures
for gaining an understanding of shareholder con-
cerns were not included. The Group defended
their decision not to include measures such as
“say-on-pay” in the Greenbury Report as share-
holders already had opportunities to raise their
concerns at corporate annual general meetings
(The Greenbury Report, 1995, pp. 32–33). How-
ever, the Group failed to consider the rights of
small shareholders whom had demonstrated out-
side the British Gas annual general meeting as
they did not feel listened to by the board or by
the large institutional shareholders. This failure to
consider shareholder views on executive pay was
tackled by legislators in 2002, when UK corporate
law introduced a requirement that corporates con-
duct an advisory “say-on-pay” at the annual gen-
eral meeting (Petrin 2015).
It was argued that the publication of pay and
benchmarking remuneration policy against com-
parator corporates could have had an inflationary
effect on executive pay (Hughes 1996). With
respect to benchmarking, there was limited guid-
ance on what corporates should be included in the
comparator group, leaving it open to manipulation
by unscrupulous executives.
There were no financial incentives provided in
theGreenbury Report for non-executive directors,
yet non-executive directors would comprise the
remuneration committee and set the remuneration
policy. Further, it was noted that the recommen-
dation for flat fees for non-executive roles was not
supported by evidence (Hahn 2006; Hahn and
Lasfer 2010). Indeed, it was claimed that flat
fees could have negative consequences as they
could relieve non-executives from the burden of
responsibility for financial loss as a result of their
errors. Moreover, Hahn (2007) reported no asso-
ciation between attendance at meetings and non-
executive director fees and concluded that flat fees
do not encourage effort.
Despite these weaknesses, there was a signifi-
cant improvement in the quality and quantity of
disclosures relating to directors and executive
remuneration following the Greenbury Report.
However, it is claimed that the increased disclo-
sure and transparency did not translate into the
desired results, as remuneration disclosure often
lacked clarity on the relationship between perfor-
mance and rewards (Petrin 2015). In addition,
most remuneration committees were not indepen-
dent, and few corporations gave their shareholders
a vote on pay, despite shareholder concerns about
executive compensation (Petrin 2015).
Summary
Prior to the Greenbury Report, the absence of
reporting requirements on remuneration commit-
tees resulted in opaque remuneration decisions
that were difficult to challenge. The Greenbury
Report and subsequent measures, that target the
pay-setting process, have demonstrated that gov-
ernance can improve the regulation of executive
pay. In addition, it is claimed that the links
between pay and performance have improved
(Petrin 2015; Ndzi 2016). The Greenbury Report
also introduced the option of nonfinancial perfor-
mance measures which most corporations now
include in the determination of executive pay.
Indeed, several studies have found an increasing
use of sustainability targets in executive incentive
schemes (Abdelmotaal and Abdel-Kader 2016;
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Clarke 2013; Labini et al. 2019). Thus, investors
can identify corporates committed to the long-
term interests of shareholders and society by
assessing their remuneration polices.
However, despite the improvements in trans-
parency and accountability, the 2008 global finan-
cial crisis revealed it was still possible for
executives to receive immense salaries and
bonuses while running up toxic debts and
unsustainable levels of risk in the corporations
they governed. Thus, shareholders continued to
be exposed to unacceptable levels of risk associ-
ated with excessive executive pay. Moreover, it is
now evident that corporate failure does not only
impact on shareholder wealth. The economic fall-
out in the aftermath of the financial crisis verified
how important the financial industry and corpo-
rate success is to society at large.
The principle established in the Greenbury
Report, that corporate boards are best suited to
determine their directors’ remuneration, still
stands. However, leaving executive pay to boards,
the continued existence of gray areas and a lack of
enforcement procedures tends to lead to ever-
increasing executive pay and the associated risks
not only to shareholders but to society.
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